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The complex relationship between Russia and Turkey is not easy to label. On the one hand, the two countries have
been historical rivals and, arguably, their interests still clash in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. On the
other hand, economic ties, particularly concerning energy, have grown over the past two decades to inextricably 
bind the two. It is also about the personalities in power. Critics liken the illiberal ways of President Tayyip Erdogan 
– including the conspiracy mind-set of blaming dissent at home on foreign meddling – to those of Vladimir Putin.1
Turkey's strained relations with its Western partners, an outcome of the stalled EU accession negotiations and the
authoritarianism creeping into its domestic politics, have, no doubt, nudged it closer to Russia. Turkey, a pivotal NATO
ally, has kept by and large out of the Ukraine crisis, refusing to join the US and EU sanctions. What is more, Putin used
his visit to Ankara in early December 2014 to rebuff the EU by scrapping the South Stream gas pipeline and launch an
alternative link to Turkey – "Turkish Stream".
Yet what we are witnessing looks more like a marriage of convenience than a fundamental realignment or the
emergence of an "axis of the excluded".2 Ankara and Moscow continue to diverge on a host of issues, from Syria,
where each backs the opposing side, to the annexation of Crimea, as solidarity with the Tatar community's plight 
runs high in Turkish society (even if Erdogan shies away from confronting Putin directly and merely gives lip service 
to this issue). Keen to avoid a heads-on collision with Russia, Turkey has nonetheless developed and strengthened
trade, investment and infrastructure links to Azerbaijan and pro-Western Georgia. Armenia is also in its spotlight; a
renewed effort at a rapprochement with Ankara, as in 2009, could in theory provide a lifeline and balance Russia's
overwhelming influence. More importantly, Turkey is a leading promoter of the so-called Southern Gas Corridor,
essential for diversifying supply to Europe away from Moscow's Gazprom. For its part, Russia has been doing its best to
contain Turkey's influence in both the Caucasus and the Middle East, often in partnership with Iran.
This Policy Brief argues that ties between Russia and Turkey are driven by pragmatism – or even naked opportunism.
Realpolitik conditions flexibility. Areas of overlapping interest are insulated from contentious dossiers such as the war
in Syria. All in all, Turkey remains ensconced in the long-standing alliance with the West, yet opts for unilateralism to
secure what it sees as national interest. This presents Russia with opportunities; it courts Turkey to gain breathing space
amidst tightening Western sanctions and an economic downturn. Energy interdependence has provided the glue
pulling Moscow and Ankara together. Yet in-depth examination shows interests are actually diverging. The argument
advanced here is that EU should make the most of this divergence to anchor Turkey to its initiatives and policies.
BACKGROUND
The nature of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement 
Remarkably, Russia and Turkey have succeeded in developing a very constructive relationship across a variety of policy
areas. They were imperial rivals and adversaries throughout the Cold War period, but the two have learned, often the
hard way, to coexist and advance common interests, even in such sensitive fields as defence.
To be sure, there have been occasional frictions in the 1990s and beyond, in Cyprus, Bosnia or Central Asia. But
overall the trajectory has been positive. The cosy relationship displayed by Putin and Erdogan is rooted in growing
economic interdependence. At present, Russia is Turkey's second most significant trading partner, while Turkey comes
after Germany as a market for Russian natural gas.
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Economic cooperation goes beyond energy. Turkish construction businesses have been harvesting lucrative deals
across Russia. According to reports, the 2014 Winter Olympics at Sochi alone brought in projects worth USD 1.6bn,
providing employment for 15.000 Turkish workers over two years.3 Russian tourist numbers in Turkey's sea resorts and
Istanbul have skyrocketed, especially since visas were lifted in 2011. A number of Russian Federation citizens own
property or have settled in Turkey.4 The two governments aim to increase turnover from USD 35bn to 100bn by the end
of the decade. Cooperation is embedded in an institutional setup: a High-Level Cooperation Council, involving the
two governments, is in operation since 2010.
For the Kremlin, Turkey also remains essential for Russia's security and geopolitical interests. Holding the keys to the
Black Sea, Turkey is a signatory of and guarantor for the Montreux Convention (1936), which governs the status of the
Straits and limits the access of non-littoral countries, notably the US and other NATO allies. Russia appreciates
Turkey's stance in favour of the status quo. In the wake of the war in Georgia (August 2008) Ankara refused to grant
permission to US hospital ships. Instead Turkey pursued conciliation by launching the so-called Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform, a multilateral diplomatic device intended to reduce tensions. Amidst the crisis, Erdogan rushed
to Moscow to meet President Dmitry Medvedev. His refusal to side with Georgia, a friendly country and US ally,
proved to the Kremlin that the new Turkey was prepared to act independently, just like it did 2003 when the Grand
National Assembly refused to authorise US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish soil. The neutrality in the ongoing
conflict in Eastern Ukraine and its subdued response to Crimea's annexation indicate that good relations with Russia
come first for Turkey. It also illustrates the gap with the EU and US, even though violence in Syria and Iraq has clearly
shown the costs of divergence from Western allies.
Like many EU members, Turkey believes that engaging rather than containing Russia serves best its commercial and
security interests. It is a choice made long before the AKP came to power in 2002. Starting from the 1990s Turkey
advanced initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) and Back Sea Naval Force
(BLACKSEAFOR) as instruments of engagement – keeping NATO at arm's length from the neighbourhood.5 While the
Ukraine crisis tests engagement, it does not feature high on the Turkish foreign agenda which is focused on issues like
Syria, ISIS and the Kurdish question. What is more, Turkey's leadership believes it can accrue economic but also
strategic benefits. At the end of the day, the choice for accommodating Russia in the Black Sea region is driven by
Ankara's assessment that it is in a weaker position vis-à-vis its mighty northern neighbour. Where it has bargaining
chips, however, e.g. in the critical area of energy, Turkey plays an intricate game of simultaneously cooperating with
Russia and profiting from its vulnerability
STATE OF PLAY
From South Stream to Turkish Stream 
Russia has come to value Turkey's friendship. That became obvious when Vladimir Putin, on a state visit to Ankara last
December casted Turkey as an alternative transit route for OAO Gazprom's deliveries to the EU. The blame for the
untimely death of the South Stream pipeline went to the European Commission and Bulgaria. Turkey, not bound by the
EU's rules on third-party access to transportation grids (the Third Energy Package), would provide while collecting
transit fees and improving security of supply. Gazprom and BOTAS, Turkey's government-owned gas operator, signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a new pipeline running through Turkish territory. According to Moscow,
"Turkish Stream", named so on Erdogan's personal insistence, would redirect up to 40% of westbound gas exports
away from Ukraine's grid. To dispel speculations this was only a bluff, Alexei Miller, Gazprom CEO, told the media in
Moscow that the Turkish option, with an estimate cost of USD 10bn, was the only one at hand. He advised EU
governments to start building the infrastructure from Turkey's borders with Greece onwards. An intergovernmental
agreement (IGA) is to be signed by mid-2015, with gas reaching Turkey by December 2016.
Clearly, both parties gain from the deal. Even if Turkey does not replace Ukraine any time soon as principal transit
route, it remains a hugely important market for Gazprom in its own right. Its booming economy consumed 47.5 bcm
of gas in 2013, with Gazprom accounting for 26.7 bcm or roughly 60% of that figure.6 It has the fastest rising demand
in OECD with consumption potentially reaching 70 bcm by 2023. Between 1990 and 2012, power generation from
natural gas rose tenfold and the upward trend is projected to go on at least until 2030.7 Since the 2003 launch of Blue
Stream Turkey has become Gazprom's second largest export destination after Germany. It makes commercial sense to
lock in soaring demand by Turkish industries and households, even if access to the retail market is cut off and BOTAS
and several small private companies are the customers.
For its part, Turkey is keen to extract concessions. In December, Putin promised a 6% discount on the gas price
(currently a little over USD 400 per 1.000 cubic meters). Turkey however is pushing for 15%, having already received
 
a 4% break in January 2013. Energy Minister Taner Yıldız demands an additional 3.5 bcm of deliveries via Blue
Stream. Turkey knows Gazprom is currently facing pressure from subcontractors and suppliers involved in South
Stream. A far-reaching offer is a precondition for talks on the engineering, technical and financial specifics of Turkish
Stream.8 The MoU is a statement of intent, falling far short of a final blueprint. The future Intergovernmental Agreement
(IGA) will also leave lots of issues open. We are yet to see how much ground Moscow will give.9 It is worth
remembering that redirecting volumes away from Ukraine is liable to legal challenges by a number of countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, which all have long-term transiting agreements.
PROSPECTS
Turkey's ambitions in energy
Before jumping to conclusions, one should put grand projects such as Turkish Stream in wider context. Turkey has
been working to reduce dependence on Russian (as well as Iranian) gas in a variety of ways. Firstly, through
diversifying gas sources; 2015 will see the start of construction works for the Transanatolian Pipeline (TANAP) which
should be completed in 2018. Owned by Azerbaijan's SOCAR (58%), BOTAS (30%) and British Petroleum (12%) it
would upgrade the existing link between the Caspian and Erzurum in Eastern Turkey and extend it all the way to the
border with Greece, with an initial yearly capacity of 16 bcm. The project will boost SOCAR, which already undercuts
Gazprom's price on the Turkish market. The Azeris target the lucrative EU market, via the projected Transadriatic
Pipeline (TAP), which should come on-stream in 2019. Turkey will receive up to 10 bcm a year of fresh volumes (a bit
under one-fifth of its current consumption). Ankara's long-term ambition is to graduate from a large consumer into an
indispensable transit country or even a trading hub.10
Turkey's second priority is to bring down natural gas share in the energy mix. Its first nuclear station at Akkuyu, near
Mersin, is expected to start operations in 2020. The USD 20bn project, financed and carried out by Rosatom, will
strengthen ties with Russia, which supplies the technology and the fuel, but will also displace significant gas
volumes.11 In February 2013, Erdogan and Japan's Shinzo Abe signed a deal for a second nuclear power station
close to the Black Sea's port of Sinop to be built by Mitsubishi along with France's Areva. Turkey has doubled 
its wing and geothermal capacity over the past ten years, and has set a 30% renewables target for 2023.12 Coal is 
also on the rise. Turkey is in talks with China and others on developing the Afsin-Elbistan field holding 45% 
of its lignite reserves.13 The project will decrease imports of coal, including from Russia, the No 2 supplier. The
declining role of gas in the energy mix, particularly in electricity generation, will reconfigure relations between
Ankara and Moscow. 
What can the EU do?
EU has no leverage to make Erdogan join the sanctions against Russia but it can do a lot to partner with Turkey on
energy security. As its Energy Union is starting to take shape, Europe should involve the Turkish government, e.g.
through an institutionalised dialogue. As energy consumers, the EU and Turkey share an interest in the stability of
supply and lower prices, including through the completion of the Southern Gas Corridor.
In fairness, that is easier said than done. Turkey will not push for full alignment with the acquis anytime soon. The
energy chapter in the accession talks has been blocked by Cyprus since December 2009. Ankara declines to join the
EU-sponsored Energy Community as a full member, like the Western Balkans along with Ukraine and Moldova. The
"unbundling" of BOTAS will proceed at a slow pace, as the government would like to cultivate its own national
champions and keep prices for end consumers affordable.
Interconnectivity is another matter. The EU can do more to upgrade gas and electricity links with Turkey. A good
example is the interconnector with Bulgaria, still in the planning stage. Coupled with the new links to Romania and
Serbia it can pipe gas from Azerbaijan and, in the future, Northern Iraq, Iran and even the Eastern Mediterranean and
Turkmenistan to markets in Central Europe. This could be part of a larger EU-sponsored endeavour to intensify
cooperation at the regional level. Experts are discussing plans for a Southeast European Grid to upgrade
interconnections of electricity networks and help Turkey and its neighbours tap into renewable resources.14 In the
long-run, such initiatives will reduce the share of gas in Turkey's energy mix, in line with declared preferences, and
improve its carbon footprint.
In case the Energy Union is granted powers vis-à-vis the long-term contracts with Gazprom, Turkey (as well as the
Western Balkans) should be brought into the process, one way or another. Paying a premium, it will be one of the
greatest beneficiaries from a convergence of gas prices across Europe.
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In the short term, the EU has to keep calm. The cool-headed reaction of top EU officials, such as Energy Commissioner
Maros Sefcovic to Alexei Miller's statements that deliveries through Ukraine are ending in 2019 is warranted.15
However, there is an element of truth in Gazprom's bombast. Ankara and Moscow will go on developing their energy
ties and more Russian gas will be bound for the Turkish market, with all the political implications that entails. This
should be reason enough for the EU to redouble its efforts to make a common cause with Turkey.
In turn, a failure by the EU to bring Turkey on board is sure to strengthen Russia's hand by delaying diversification of
gas supplies, offsetting incentives to advance interconnectivity, undermining regional cooperation and deepening the
gap between Ankara and Brussels. What is now essentially a marriage of convenience between Russians and Turks
might mature into an affair of the heart.
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